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The Right of an Employee Under OSHA to
Refuse to Work in the Face of Imminent
Danger
Wilbur W. Fluegel*
I. INTRODUCTION
An employee who fears that an "imminent danger"' exists
in his workplace has an express right under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 2 to request an immedi-
ate inspection by OSHA personnel to confirm the danger.3 Al-
though the Act prohibits employers from retaliating against
employees who exercise this right,4 it fails to provide commen-
* Member of the Minnesota Bar.
1. Section 13(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA), empowers federal district courts, upon petition of the Secretary of La-
bor,
to restrain any conditions or practices in any place of employment
which are such that a danger exists which could reasonably be ex-
pected to cause death or serious physical harm immediately or before
the imminence of such danger can be eliminated through the enforce-
ment procedures otherwise provided by this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1976).
2. Id. §§ 651-678.
3. Id. § 657(f) (1) (1976). The employee's request must be made in writing
and must set forth with "reasonable particularity" the alleged violation of
OSHA that "threatens physical harm, or... imminent danger." Id. Once an
inspector confirms that such a danger exists, he must 'inform the affected em-
ployees and employers of the danger and that he is recommending ... that re-
lief be sought." Id. § 662(c). The regional administrator, acting for the
Secretary of Labor, may then petition a federal district court for an injunction
that will "prohibit the employment or presence of any individual .. . where
such imminent danger exists" and that will "require such steps ... as may be
necessary to avoid, correct, or remove such imminent danger." Id. § 662(a).
Should the government arbitrarily fail to secure such relief, the employee has
standing to bring an action in the nature of mandamus to compel the Secretary
to seek an injunction. Id. § 662(d).
4. Section 11(c) (1) of OSHA prohibits employers from discharging or dis-
criminating against employees because they have exercised "any right afforded
by this chapter." Id. § 660(c) (1). The Act states,
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any
employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted
or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chap-
ter or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or be-
cause of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or others
of any right afforded by this chapter.
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surate protection to employees who refuse to work because
they are faced with an imminent threat of death or serious in-
jury, and because there is insufficient time to eliminate the
threat by following normal statutory procedures. OSHA's fail-
ure to provide explicit protection for employees in circum-
stances where they have no time to await the arrival of an
inspector creates a significant gap in its scheme of enforce-
ment.
The fundamental issue under this section of OSHA is
therefore whether employees faced with imminent danger have
an implicit right to refuse to perform any work until an inspec-
tor arrives, without being subject to retaliatory discipline or
discharge. In a carefully worded regulation,5 the Secretary of
Labor 6 has attempted to resolve this issue by interpreting
OSHA's prohibition against retaliatory discharge as an implicit
grant to employees of the right to refuse to work in the face of
imminent danger.7
The validity of this regulation has been the subject of sev-
eral recent court decisions8 that sharply divide on the question
of whether the Secretary's construction of the statute is within
the limits of his discretion.9 The Fifth Circuit, in Marshall v.
Id. Section 11(c)(2) allows "[a]ny employee who believes that he has been
discharged or otherwise discriminated against [to] file a complaint with the
Secretary [who] shall cause such investigation to be made as he deems appro-
priate." Id. § 660(c) (2). Remedies available to the employee upon a finding of
employer retaliation include "rehiring or reinstatement of the employee to his
former position with back pay" and other "appropriate relief." Id.
5. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1978).
6. OSHA provides that the Secretary of Labor has the authority and re-
sponsibility to establish standards regulating occupational safety. 29 U.S.C.
§ 655 (1976).
7. The regulation concedes that "there is no right afforded by the Act
which would entitle employees to walk off the job because of potential unsafe
conditions," 29 C.F.R. § 1977. 12(b) (1) (1978), but indicates that protection from
retaliatory discipline should be afforded when "occasions ... arise [in which]
an employee is confronted with a choice between not performing assigned
tasks or subjecting himself to serious injury or death from a hazardous condi-
tion at the workplace." Id. § 1977.12(b) (2).
8. See, e.g., Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir.) (reversing
lower court that had held regulation invalid), appeal docketed, No. 78-1870
(Sept. 21, 1979); Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977) (af-
firming lower court that had held regulation invalid), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880
(1978); Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (hold-
ing regulation valid). See also Usery v. Certified Welding Corp., 6 OCcUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH CAsES (BNA) 1142,1144, [1978] OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
& HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 22,605, at 27,280 (D. Wyo. 1977) (holding regulation in-
valid).
9. The process of judicial review, as applied to the "law formulation" of an
administrative agency, typically involves an initial inquiry as to whether the
agency's interpretation is beyond the boundaries of its governing statute. See
[Vol. 64:115
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Daniel Construction Co.,1° concluded that Congress, by re-
jecting certain OSHA provisions"1 that were similar to the Sec-
retary's regulation, made clear its intent that employees should
not be permitted to walk off the job, even when confronted by
imminent danger.' 2 The Daniel court therefore held that the
regulation exceeded the Secretary's authority to promulgate
regulations under the Act.' 3 More recently, the Sixth Circuit,
in Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp.,'4 reached the opposite result,
finding the regulation to be consistent with both the purposes
and the legislative history of the Act.'5 The Whirlpool court
generally H. HART, JR. & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1345-47 (1958). Should
an interpretation be deemed consistent with the agency's statutory purpose, a
reviewing court will treat the interpretation with great deference. See, e.g.,
Clarkson Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 531 F.2d
451, 457 (10th Cir. 1976); Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm'n, 513
F.2d 553, 554 (10th Cir. 1975); H. HART, JR. & A. SACKS, supra, at 1346. Accord,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Udall v. Talman, 380 U.S.
1, 16-17 (1965). Thus, "[o]nly such regulations as are clearly inconsistent with
the [governing] statute can be voided," Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F.
Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Mich. 1976); however, "a[ny] regulation which.., operates
to create a rule out of harmony with the [governing] statute is a mere nullity."
Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).
10. 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
11. One of the provisions rejected by Congress was the "strike with pay"
clause, which would have permitted workers to absent themselves from work
without losing pay if certain toxic substances were found at the workplace. See
text accompanying notes 91-121 infra. The second rejected provision would
have permitted inspectors to shut down plants for up to 72 hours upon a finding
of "imminent danger." See text accompanying notes 122-137 infra.
12. The Daniel court ruled that the regulation
expressly confers upon employees a right Congress deliberately chose
not to grant to OSHA inspectors .... Moreover, by permitting employ-
ees to refuse work upon making [a determination that there is insuffi-
cient time, due to the urgency of the situation, to eliminate an
imminent danger through resort to regular means], the regulation pro-
vides them authority equivalent to that of an OSHA inspector when is-
suing an administrative stop work order-a right which Congress also
deliberately withheld from OSHA inspectors. A worker's abuse of...
the regulation could disrupt or cripple an employer's business. The
legislative history is manifest that Congress feared such a result. We
hold that the regulation exceeds the Secretary's scope of authority to
promulgate regulations as granted under the Act.
Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 880 (1978) (footnote and citation omitted).
13. Id. at 715.
14. 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir.), appeal docketed, No. 78-1870 (Sept. 21, 1979).
15. The Whirlpool court stated,
Two district courts below ruled that this regulation is invalid because it
has no statutory support and because OSHA's legislative history
reveals Congressional intent at odds with the regulation. The district
courts have sanctioned an employer's right to make workers choose be-
tween their jobs and their lives.
We cannot agree that the statute was ever intended to require
placing an employee in such an untenable position. Since we find that
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held that the regulation was "an appropriate employment of
the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary by the stat-
ute."16
This Article analyzes the question of whether the regula-
tion is an appropriate exercise of regulatory power consistent
with the statutory purposes of and the legislative intent under-
lying OSHA. The Article begins with an analysis of OSHA's
statutory provisions and next discusses the degree of judicial
deference ordinarily accorded administrative rulemaking under
such broadly phrased statutes. It then considers whether the
implicit right to walk off the job when confronted by imminent
danger is unnecessary under OSHA, given the scope of other
remedial labor statutes, and discusses the probable effect of
recognizing an employee's right to walk off the job under haz-
ardous conditions. The Article concludes that the regulation
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor is a necessary and
proper interpretation of the Act.
II. OSHA STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The express intent of Congress in enacting the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970 17 was "to assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human re-
sources."'18 Congress sought to accomplish these broad objec-
tives "by encouraging employers and employees ... to reduce
the number of occupational safety and health hazards,"' 9 and
"by providing that employers and employees have separate but
dependent responsibilities and iJghts with respect to achieving
safe and healthful working conditions. '2 0
Employers, therefore, were charged with the responsibility
of furnishing their employees with "a place of employment
[that is] free from recognized hazards that are causing or are
the Secretary's regulation is consistent with the stated purposes of the
Act and its legislative history,. . . we reverse ....
Id. at 717. The Whirlpool court made its ruling "aware that [it] places us
squarely in conflict with.., the Fifth Circuit." Id. at 736.
16. Id. at 717.
17. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976)).
Most of the legislative history of the Act is compiled in Suncomm. ON LABOR OF
THE SENATE Comm. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, 92D CONG., IST SEss., LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE OccupAToNAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970 (Comm.
Print 1971) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
18. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
19. Id. §651(b)(1).
20. Id. § 651(b) (2).
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likely to cause death or serious physical harm,"2 1 and of "com-
ply [ing] with occupational safety and health standards promul-
gated under [OSHA]. 22 Employees were granted the express
right2 3 to ifie a written request for an immediate inspection
whenever they fear that an imminent danger is present in their
workplace.24 Upon receiving such a request, the agency must
determine whether the request is reasonable, notifying the
complainant in writing if an inspection is deemed unnecessary,
but undertaking immediate inspection if it is deemed appropri-
ate.25 If an inspection is considered necessary, an OSHA Com-
pliance Safety and Health Officer (CSHO) must enter the
workplace as soon as is practicable, 26 investigate the hazard,
and recommend a course of action.2 7 Should the inspector find
that a standard has been violated, he must issue a citation to
the employer.2 If the inspector believes that conditions in the
workplace are so violative of OSHA standards "that a danger
exists which could reasonably be expected to cause death or
serious physical harm immediately or before the imminence of
21. Id. § 654(a) (1).
22. Id. § 654(a) (2).
23. OSHA expressly grants several other rights to employees, such as the
right to participate in establishing standards for health and safety, id. § 656,
and the right to be advised by their employers both of hazards proscribed
under the Act that exist at the workplace, id. § 657(c) (1), and of potential expo-
sure to toxic or dangerous materials. Id. § 657(c) (3). Each employee must also
be notified of any citations issued against the employer, id. § 658(b), and of any
application made by the employer for a variance from OSHA standards. Id.
§ 655(d) (permanent variances); id. § 655(b) (6) (B) (v) (temporary variance ap-
plications). In addition, the Act gives the employee the right to intervene in
the employer's contest, if any, of an OSHA decision, id. § 659(c), and to dispute
the time set for abatement of a violation. Id. An employee may appeal the de-
cision of the Review Commission to a circuit court, id. § 660(a), and may even
challenge the validity of an OSHA standard. Id. § 655(f). Finally, OSHA grants
employees the right to insist that an employee representative accompany an
OSHA inspector on any inspection. Id. 657(e).
24. Id. §657(f)(1).
25. Id.
26. The OSHA Field Operations Manual states,
Any allegation of imminent danger received by an OSHA office,
whether written or oral, shall be handled on a highest priority basis.
Other commitments ... and other considerations cannot interfere with
the expedited and thorough handling of these cases.
... The evaluation of the imminent danger should be accom-
plished immediately. Except in extraordinary circumstances, any in-
spection should be conducted within 24 hours of receipt of the
allegation.
EMPLOYMENT SAFETY AND HEALTH GUIDE, OSHA FmruL OPERATIONS MANUAL
AND INDusTRIAL HYGIENE FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL (CCH) 58 (1979) [herein-
after cited as OSHA MANUAL].
27. Id. at 57-61.
28. Id. at 61; see 29 U.S.C. § 658 (1976).
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such danger can be eliminated through [other] enforcement
procedures," 29 he must seek immediate injunctive relief in fed-
eral district court.30 To ensure that employees will not be de-
terred from exercising their rights for fear of employer
reprisals, the Act forbids employers to "discharge or in any
manner discriminate against any employee because such em-
ployee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be in-
stituted any proceeding under" the Act, or "exercise[d] ...
any right afforded" by the Act.3 1
The rights of threatened employees during the pendency of
the preinjunctive procedures are not expressly considered in
the Act.32 Thus, a literal reading of OSHA's imminent danger
provisions would limit employees confronted with a serious
hazard to a "Hobson's choice" between two equally dissatisfy-
ing alternatives: they may either refuse to perform the as-
signed task and risk retaliatory discipline, or they may subject
themselves to imminent threats of serious injury.33 Since the
29. 29 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1976).
30. Id. §§ 662(a), (b). The OSHA Field Operations Manual indicates that,
absent situations in which "voluntary elimination" of a danger is assured,
OSHA MANuAL, supra note 26, at 60, the employer should be asked to remove
his employees from the area, id., and the Compliance Safety and Health Officer
(CSHO) "shall call the Area Director and discuss contacting the Regional So-
licitor ... to obtain a Temporary Restraining Order.... ." Id. The Manual
also states that "[t]he . . . Regional Solicitor shall make immediate arrange-
ments for the initiation of court action," id. at 61, and that the "CSHO shall give
absolute first priority in scheduling his activities to prepare for litigation in im-
minent danger matters." Id.
Should the "Secretary arbitrarily or capriciously fail . . . to seek relief
under this [injunctive provision], any employee who may be injured by reason
of such failure, or the representative of such employees" may bring a federal
court action in mandamus to "compel the Secretary to seek such an order." 29
U.S.C. § 662(d) (1976). But see Oldham, OSHA May Not Work in "Imminent
Danger" Cases, 60 A.B.A.J. 690, 691-92 (1974) (criticizing utility of mandamus as
a remedy, given its abolition by FED. R. Crv. P. 81(b), and the effect of docket
delays on a hearing).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976).
32. As Circuit Judge Damon J. Keith noted in Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp.,
The knowledgeable employee who withdraws from the imminent job
hazard and immediately take [sic] steps to locate an inspector is pro-
tected from retaliation. Yet,.. . the employee who withdraws from the
danger but reasonably waits, or must wait, to summon an inspector or
for one to arrive [before going back to work], can be fired without re-
course-no matter what hazard he faced.
593 F.2d 715, 723 (6th Cir.), appeal docketed, No. 78-1870 (Sept. 21, 1979).
33. See, e.g., id. at 736 ("A worker should not have to choose between his
job and his life ... ."); Marshall v; Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 722 (5th Cir.
1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (the issue is whether the employee "had to lose
his job to avoid return to a dangerous work-place"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880
(1978); Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 424 F. Supp. 753, 758 (E.D. Mich. 1976)
('In the [interval before an OSHA inspector can arrive,] the complaining em-
ployee is confronted with the Hobson's choice of accepting the work assign-
[Vol. 64:115
express provisions of the Act merely allow employees to com-
plain to the Secretary and wait for an inspector to arrive,34 the
Act apparently permits employers to insist that employees con-
fronted with an imminent threat return to work, on penalty of
discipline or discharge, at least until the CSHO inspector ar-
rives.
35
The Secretary of Labor has concluded that a limited right
to refuse dangerous work in this situation exists by necessary
implication. 36 Relying on the employer's general duty under
the Act to furnish a workplace "free from recognized hazards
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to his employees," 37 and on the Act's protection of em-
ployees from retaliation for their exercise of "any right af-
forded" them by OSHA,38 the Secretary determined,
If the employee, with no reasonable alternative, refuses in good faith to
expose himself to the dangerous condition, he would be protected
against subsequent discrimination. The condition causing the em-
ployee's apprehension of death or injury must be of such a nature that
a reasonable person, under the circumstances then confronting the em-
ployee, would conclude that there is a real danger of death or serious
injury and that there is insufficient time, due to the urgency of the situ-
ment and risking death or serious bodily injury ... or refusing to ... work and
being permanently discharged.") (footnotes omitted); Brief for the Secretary of
Labor at 22, Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir.), appeal dock-
eted, No 78-1870 (Sept. 21, 1979) ("the worker dilemma posed by these hypo-
thetical facts-getting killed or maimed versus being fired-is made powerfully
concrete by the record"); Reply Brief for the Secretary of Labor at 13, Usery v.
Daniel Constr. Co., reported sub nom. Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d
707 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978) ("the critical juncture where
an employee must immediately choose between his life or his job is precisely
the point at which such preservation must start"); Brief Amicus Curiae for the
Industrial Union Department, AF-CIO at 8, Usery v. Daniel Constr. Co., re-
ported sub nom. Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978) (the employee is "confronted [by] a Hobson's
choice: loss of employment or risk of death from imminent danger").
34. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f) (1) (1976).
35. See, e.g., Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 723 (6th Cir.), appeal
docketed, No. 78-1870 (Sept. 21, 1979). The OSHA Field Operations Manual
states that, until an injunction is secured, the "CSHO has no authority either to
order the closing down of the operation or to direct employees to leave the area
of the imminent danger or the workplace," OSHA MANuAL, supra note 26, at 60.
The employer must instead be "requested to notify his employees of the danger
and remove them from the area of imminent danger." Id. (emphasis added).
The determination by an inspector that an imminent danger exists may be so
closely related to the enforcement process that employers would not, as a prac-
tical matter, order employees to work until an injunction issued. It is not clear,
however, that 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2) would protect an employee from discipline
for refusing to work during this interim period. No case has yet confronted this
issue.
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(a)-.12(b) (2) (1978).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1) (1976).
38. Id. §660(c)(1).
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ation, to eliminate the danger through resort to regular statutory en-
forcement channels. In addition, in such circumstances, the employee,
where possible, must also have sought from his employer, and been
unable to obtain, a correction of the dangerous condition.
3 9
The right of employees to walk off the job when reasonably ap-
prehensive of imminent serious injury will depend on whether
the courts view the Secretary's construction of the Act as a
valid exercise of his regulatory powers. The validity of his
construction should, in turn, be viewed with OSHA's primary
purpose in mind: "encouraging employers and employees...
to reduce the number of occupational safety and health
hazards."4 Given the concededly inadequate number of OSHA
enforcement personnel,4 1 this express responsibility to provide
a safe and healthful workplace would appear to be seriously
undermined if employees do not have the implicit right to en-
force their employer's responsibility when it is most egre-
giously violated.
Ill. VALIDITY OF THE SECRETARY'S INTERPRETATION
A. JuDiCiAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
OSHA delegates broad power to adopt regulations ensuring
"safe and healthful working conditions,"42 and authorizes the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to "prescribe such
rules and regulations as he may deem necessary" to carry out
his joint responsibilities with the Secretary of Labor, "including
rules and regulations dealing with the inspection of an em-
ployer's establishment."43  When Congress empowers an
agency to promulgate regulations necessary to carry out its re-
sponsibilities under an act, such regulations are generally enti-
tled to great judicial deference, and are presumed valid.44 In
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1277.12(b) (2) (1978).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1) (1976). See also text accompanying notes 17-20
supra.
41. See note 56 infra and accompanying text.
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b), 657(g) (2) (1976).
43. Id. § 657(g) (2). '"ere are overlapping functions with the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) which involve recordkeeping and re-
search." Symposium-The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: An
Overview, 9 GoNz. L. REv. 477, 485 (1974) (footnote omitted).
44. The scope of judicial review accorded regulations promulgated under
an intentionally broad congressional delegation of power is limited:
Where a statute specifically delegates to an administrative agency the
power to make rules, courts recognize a presumption that such rules,
when duly noticed, are valid .... This presumption is rebuttable...
upon a showing that the challenged regulation is an unreasonable exer-
cise of the delegated power-i.e., inconsistent with the statute. ...
The burden placed on [one challenging a regulation] is thus a heavy
one, for he must show that the [regulation] cannot be considered a rea-
[Vol. 64:115
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order to sustain a challenged regulation, therefore, a court need
not find that the agency's interpretation is the most reasonable
one, but only that it is consistent with the purposes of its en-
abling statute.45
The stated objectives of OSHA reflect its "broad remedial
purpose":46 the preservation of human resources. 47 It is a tradi-
tion that courts liberally construe statutes whose primary pur-
pose is to protect human life:
Since the Act in question is a remedial and safety statute, with its pri-
mary concern being the preservation of human life, it is the type of en-
actment as to which a "narrow or limited construction is to be
eschewed." . . . Rather, [a] court must interpret the Act liberally in
light of its primary purpose.
4 8
Those who challenge regulations promulgated under acts such
as OSHA must therefore overcome not only the deference
sonable expression of the Congressional will, even though Congress
has given the [agency] broad authority to make that determination.
United States v. Boyd, 491 F.2d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 1973) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Grubbs v. Butz, 514 F.2d 1323, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("agency regula-
tions are of course normally presumed valid unless shown to be inconsistent
with the statute they implement"); Hoffenberg v. Kaminstein, 396 F.2d 684, 685
(D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) ("A regulation, of course, is presumptively valid and
ordinarily should be upheld unless it is inconsistent with the statute.... Even
if there were some doubt, we would be required to resolve that doubt in favor
of the [agency's] interpretation.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 913
(1968). See generally United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977);
Manhatten Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).
45. The Supreme Court has indicated, "To sustain the [agency's] applica-
tion of [a] statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only rea-
sonable one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had the
question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings." Unemployment
Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946). "When faced with a
problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the in-
terpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its admin-
istration." Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). This degree of respect is
"[p]articularly ... due when the administrative practice at stake 'involves a
contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the re-
sponsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work effi-
ciently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new."' Power Reactor
Dev. Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 367 U.S.
396, 408 (1961) (quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288
U.S. 294, 315 (1933)).
46. Marshall v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 577 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1978); Clark-
son Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 531 F.2d 451,
458 (10th Cir. 1976).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
48. Freeman Coal Mining Co. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals,
504 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1974) (quoting St. Marys Sewer Pipe Co. v. Director of
United States Bureau of Mines, 262 F.2d 378, 381 (3d Cir. 1959)) (construing im-
minent danger provision of Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969, 30
U.S.C. § 814(a) (1976)). See Lilly v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 317 U.S. 481, 486
(1943); Rushton Mining Co. v. Morton, 520 F.2d 716, 720 (3d Cir. 1975).
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courts generally accord agency interpretations but also the ten-
dency to construe liberally statutes such as OSHA.
B. DEFERENCE ACCORDED AGENCY FINDINGS OF IMPLICIT
STATUTORY RIGHTS
Because OSHA affords employees no express right to re-
fuse work when confronted by imminent danger,4 9 the right
must be inferred from the purposes or provisions of the Act.
Through its general duty clause, 50 OSHA extends to employers
the responsibility to furnish a workplace free of foreseeable
and preventable hazards51 which cause or are likely to cause
death or serious physical injuries.52 The intent of Congress to
protect employees is prevalent throughout the Act and is in-
cluded in its announced "purpose" of ensuring "safe and
healthful working conditions. '53
The Act's goal is to enforce, in two ways, an employer's
duty to protect his employee's safety. Not only does the Act
provide remedies when injuries occur, but it also regulates po-
tentially hazardous conditions5 4 before accidents occur. Al-
though the Act specifically provides for the training of safety
specialists to enforce compliance with its regulatory stan-
dards,55 the task of enforcement easily surpasses the resources
of this worldorce. 56 At the time it enacted OSHA, Congress
49. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1) (1976).
51. See California Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 517 F.2d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Congress clearly intended to
require employers to eliminate all foreseeable and preventable hazards."); Na-
tional Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
489 F.2d 1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973); H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21
(1970) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1291], reprinted in LEGISLATIvE HIs-
TORY, supra note 17, at 851 ("An employer's duty under [the general duty
clause] is not an absolute one. It is the Committee's intent that an employer
exercise care to furnish a safe and healthful place to work .... This is not a
vague duty, but is protection of the worker from preventable dangers.").
52. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1) (1976); see Cape & Vineyard Div. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 512 F.2d 1148, 1150 (1st Cir. 1975); Shimp v.
New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 521-22, 368 A.2d 408, 410-11 (Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1976) (applying concurrent state power permitted by 29 U.S.C.
§ 653(b) (4)).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
54. Violations of the general duty clause are not preconditioned on the oc-
currence of an accident. See, e.g., Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520
F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1975); REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822, 825
(2d Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 494
F.2d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 1974); National Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 489 F.2d 1257, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 670 (1976).
56. The limited number of enforcement personnel are clearly incapable of
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was aware that there would be a shortage of qualified enforce-
ment personnel and therefore emphasized employee assistance
in enforcement.5 7
1. Retaliatory Discharge Provision
In order to protect the safety-minded employee from dis-
charge or discipline for reporting a dangerous situation to au-
thorities, the Act prohibits retaliatory discharge of, or
discrimination against, any employee for exercising "any right
afforded" him by the Act.58 Thus, formal complaints initiated
by employees who seek to enforce a right articulated by the
Act, such as the right to be free from foreseeable and prevent-
able hazards, may not be the basis for discipline.
There is no language in the Act, however, that expressly
permits an employee to refuse work because of dangerous
work conditions. Its provisions merely allow employees the
right to summon a CSHO inspector.5 9 Under a strict construc-
tion of the statute,60 therefore, it is permissible for an employer
to discipline an employee who refuses to work until an inspec-
tor arrives. This is the construction accorded the Act by some
administering regular inspections of the more than four million places of em-
ployment covered by the Act. See, e.g., Cohen, The Occupational Safety &
Health Act A Labor Lawyer's Overview, 33 Omo ST. L.J. 788, 800 (1972); Sym-
posium, supra note 43, at 485-86.
57. See H.R. REP. No. 1291, supra note 51, at 31, reprinted in LEGIsLATrVE
HisTORY, supra note 17, at 861 ("The Committee recognizes that a substantial
increase in [enforcement] manpower... is needed .... In order to promote a
greater awareness of safety in the workplace, the bill also provides for em-
ployee training to be conducted by the Secretary .... "); S. REP. No. 1282, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1970) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1282], reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 161-62, and reprinted in [19701 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5198-99 ("Both Federal and state safety and
health inspectors are in critically short supply.... Section 18 [therefore] au-
thorizes ... programs for the education of safety and health personnel. In or-
der to promote a greater awareness of safety. the bill also provides for the'
training of employers and employees .. ").
58. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1) (1976), quoted in note 4 supra. The statute not
only protects against retaliation by an employer, but against discrimination by
any "person." Discrimination against the employees of another is therefore
prohibited. See 29 C.F. § 1977.4 (1978).
59. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
60. See Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 708 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978) (refusing to apply retaliatory discharge provision to
prohibit discharge of employee who refused to work "under conditions which
reasonably caused him to conclude that there was a real and immediate danger
of death or serious injury if he performed his assigned work .... "). See gener-
ally Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 723 (6th Cir.) ("absurd results"
can occur if the Act is read not to extend the right to avoid work under danger-
ous conditions), appeal docketed, No. 78-1870 (Sept. 21, 1979).
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courts. 61 The Secretary has construed the Act liberally, how-
ever, and has concluded that a limited right to refuse to per-
form extremely hazardous work is implicit in the general right
to a safe workplace. The Secretary has therefore promulgated
a regulation that extends the protection of OSHA's retaliatory
discharge provision to employees who have been disciplined
for refusing to work in imminently dangerous assignments.62
2. Judicial Treatment of Rights Implicit in Safety Statutes
Safety regulations promulgated under broad congressional
delegations of authority are liberally construed by reviewing
courts.63 In particular, judicial construction of retaliatory dis-
charge provisions in remedial statutes similar to OSHA has
been liberal. For example, the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) provides that it is an unfair labor practice when an
employer discharges "or otherwise discriminate [s] against an
employee because he has filed charges or given testimony"
under provisions of the NLRA.6 4 The Supreme Court, in NLRB
v. Scrivener,65 held that although the NLRA's express provi-
sions protect only those employees who have filed charges or
have given testimony, the Act should be liberally construed to
implicitly protect employees who have given written state-
ments to NLRB field officers.66 The Court focused on the words
"otherwise discriminate," as evidence of "an intent on the part
of Congress to afford broad rather than narrow protection to
the employee. '67
A second example, the Fair Labor Standards Act, provides
that it is unlawful "to discharge or in any other manner discrim-
inate against any employee because [he] has fied any com-
plaint or instituted ... any proceeding ... or has testified...
or has served ... on an industry committee. '68 The statute's
61. See, e.g., Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978); Usery v. Whirlpool Corp., 416 F. Supp. 30 (N.D.
Ohio 1976), rev'd sub nom. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir.),
appeal docketed, No. 78-1870 (Sept. 21, 1979).
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1978).
63. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976).
65. 405 U.S. 117 (1972).
66. Id. at 124-25 (' he approach to [the anti-discharge provision] generally
has been a liberal one in order fully to effectuate the section's remedial pur-
pose .... We therefore conclude that an employer's discharge of an employee
because the employee gave a written sworn statement... constitutes a viola-
tion of [the] Act.").
67. Id. at 122.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (3) (1976) (emphasis added).
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express protection is restricted to employees. The Sixth Cir-
cuit, however, held in Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co. 6 9 that the
Act, by implication, protects former employees from retaliation.
The court reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise would do violence
to the Congressional intent and purposes of the Act and would
prejudice the effective enforcement of the Act. 7 0
A similar provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer to discriminate against his employees or applicants for
employment... because he has opposed any... unlawful em-
ployment practice.., or... made a charge, testified [or] as-
sisted ... in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing .... -71
In Smith v. Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority,72 this
retaliatory conduct provision was liberally construed to protect
an employee, uninvolved in a race discrimination charge, who
was disciplined for refusing to cooperate with an employer de-
fending itself against the charge.7 3
A final example is the Coal Mine Safety and Health Act
which, prior to its 1977 amendments, provided that "[nIo per-
son shall discharge or in any other way discriminate against
... any miner... by reason of the fact that [he] has notified
the Secretary ... of any alleged ... danger,. . . has filed...
any proceeding ... or ... has testified ... about ... enforce-
ment."7 4 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held, in Phillips v. Interior Board of Mine Operations Ap-
peals,7 5 that the protection of the Act began "when the miner
notifle[d] his foreman ... of possible safety violations. '76
Thus, it protected an employee who was discharged "because
69. 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977).
70. Id. at 147.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976).
72. 443 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
73. Id. at 63-64. See also Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565
F.2d 1162, 1164-66 (10th Cir. 1977) (former employer's act of informing prospec-
tive employer that employee had filed a sex discrimination charge, held to be
violation of Act despite employee's voluntary resignation); EEOC v. Kallir,
Philips, Ross, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 66, 72-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (filing of sex discrimi-
nation charge held inapprorpiate basis for termination of employment; good
faith business justification was pretext), aff'd mem., 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
74. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173,
§ 110(b) (1), 83 Stat. 758 (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (1) (Supp. 1 1977))
(emphasis added). This provision in the 1969 Act was amended in 1977 by the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164,
tit. 11, § 201, 91 Stat. 1303.
75. 500 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975).
76. Id. at 778.
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of his failure to comply with an order to return to work, despite
his belief that the working conditions were dangerous. '77
When Congress amended the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
in 1977,7 8 it cited Phillips and noted that the amendment was
intended "to insure the continuing vitality of the various judi-
cial interpretations of [the retaliatory discharge provision] of
the Coal Act which are consistent with the broad protection of
the bill's provisions." 79
The construction accorded the retaliatory discharge provi-
sions in all of these statutes has been liberal. Courts have
found many employee rights implicit in the broad statutory lan-
guage. None of these statutes, however, contain language
broader than the retaliatory discharge provision of OSHA.80
The Supreme Court has determined that the NLRA's protec-
tion against employer action that "otherwise discriminate [s]"
against employees is dispositive of the fact that the NLRA's re-
taliatory discharge provision should be liberally construed.81
The same analysis should apply to OSHA since its language is
even broader, protecting employees against actions that "in any
manner discriminate. '82 In addition, the NLRA, the Coal Mine
Safety and Health Act,83 the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the
Fair Labor Standards Act only protect employees against the
infringement of specifically enumerated rights84 while OSHA
protects the exercise by an employee "of any right afforded" by
77. Id. at 774.
78. See Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-961 (Supp. I 1977)).
79. S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3436.
80. When Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975), was decided, the Coal Mine
Safety and Health Act's retaliatory discharge provision contained the language
set out at text accompanying note 74 supra. The provision was amended in
1977, see notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text, and now contains language
of a similar broad nature: "No person shall discharge or in any manner dis-
criminate against.., or otherwise interfere with the exercise of the statutory
rights of any miner. . . ." 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (1) (Supp. I 1977).
81. See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1) (1976). This language is similar to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which makes it unlawful to discharge or "in any other manner
discriminate," id. § 215(a) (3), and the language originally used in the Coal
Mine Safety and Health Act, which made it a violation to "in any other way dis-
criminate." See text accompanying note 74 supra. The Coal Mine Safety and
Health Act now uses the language "in any manner discriminate." See note 80
supra.
83. The 1970 Act has been amended. See note 80 supra. The 1977 provision
now extends the protection to "any statutory right afforded by this chapter." 30
U.S.C. § 815(c) (1) (Supp. 1 1977).
84. See text accompanying notes 64, 68, 71, 74 supra.
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the Act.85 Presumably, this language in OSHA refers to im-
plicit as well as explicit rights. The courts that have refused to
recognize the implicit right under OSHA to walk off the job
when faced with imminent danger have therefore departed
from the traditional policy of liberally construing labor legisla-
tion that is remedial in character 86 and legislation that broadly
delegates power to an agency to create regulatory guidelines.87
Courts that have found the Secretary's regulation invalid have
based their decisions on the belief that the regulation is incon-
sistent with congressional intent.88 Resolving the issue of the
regulation's validity therefore requires an assessment of con-
gressional objectives.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
In enacting OSHA, Congress did not consider the issue of
an employee's right to refuse to work in the face of imminent
danger. The judiciary's rationale for concluding that Congress
did not intend such a right rests on congressional discussion of
and objections to two particular provisions.
A. STE WrrH PAY PROVISION
The first justification advanced by courts in support of the
contention that Congress did not intend to provide employees
the right to refuse an imminently dangerous work assignment8 9
is the House's rejection of a bill, H.R. 16785, introduced by Rep-
resentative Daniels.90 One provision of the bill would have per-
mitted employees to absent themselves from their jobs, with
85. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1) (1976) (emphasis added).
86. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
87. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
88. Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 715 (5th Cir. 1977) ("We
hold that the regulation exceeds the Secretary's scope of authority to promul-
gate regulations as granted under the Act."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978);
Usery v. Whirlpool Corp., 416 F. Supp. 30, 33 (N.D. Ohio 1976, rev'd sub nom.
Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir.) ("This Court is of the opin-
ion that the regulation in question is clearly inconsistent with the statute and
therefore invalid."), appeal docketed, No. 78-1870 (Sept. 21, 1979).
89. See, e.g., Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 712-13 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978); Usery v. Whirlpool Corp., 416 F. Supp. 30,
33-34 (N.D. Ohio 1976), rev'd sub nom. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715
(6th Cir.), appeal docketed, No. 78-1870 (Sept. 21, 1979).
90. H.R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 16785],
reprinted in LEGISLATrIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 755-56. The House rejected
the bill by substituting an alternative bill, H.R. 19200, for H.R. 16785. See note
100 infra and accompanying text.
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pay, when exposed to certain toxic substances.91 This portion
of the bill became known as the "strike with pay" provision.92
1. Legislative Action
Opponents of the bill attacked the provision as enabling
employees to call a strike and continue to receive pay when-
ever the Secretary determined that the workplace contained a
"known or potentially toxic substance. '93 According to the
House Committee on Education and Labor, the provision was
necessary because of the "real danger that an employee may
be economically coerced into self-exposure in order to earn his
livelihood, so the bill allows an employee to absent himself
from that specific danger for the period of its duration without
loss of pay. '94
Although opposition to Representative Daniels' bill cen-
tered largely on provisions other than the "strike with pay"
clause,95 the bill's opponents rallied around H.R. 19200, in-
91. H.R. 16785, supra note 90, § 19(a)(5), reprinted in LEGISLATVE HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 755-56. The provision required that the Secretary of HEW
shall publish within six months of enactment of this act and thereafter
... at least annually a list of all known or potentially toxic substances
... ; and shall determine following a request by any employer or au-
thorized representative of any group of employees whether any sub-
stance normally found in the working place has potentially toxic or
harmful effects .... Within sixty days of such determination. . . , an
employer shall not require any employee to be exposed to such sub-
stance designated above in toxic or greater concentrations unless [inter
alia] such exposed employee may absent himself from such risk of
harm for the period necessary to avoid such danger without loss of reg-
ular compensation for such period.
Id. (emphasis added).
92. The employee's right to leave the workplace without loss of normal pay
resulted in § 19(a) (5) being called the "strike with pay" provision. See gener-
ally 116 CONG. REc. 38,379 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HsToRY, supra
note 17, at 1011 (remarks of Rep. Randall); 116 CONG. REC. 38,369 (1970), re-
printed in LEGISLATiVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 986 (remarks of Rep. Per-
kins).
93. H.R. 16785, supra note 90, § 19(a) (5), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 755-56.
94. H.R. REP. No. 1291, supra note 51, at 30, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY, supra note 17, at 860.
95. Most of the controversy over OSHA did not center on the "strike with
pay" provision but on other aspects of labor-supported bills, such as the proce-
dures for establishing protective standards, see H.R. REP. No. 1291, supra note
51, at 49-50, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 879-80, whether
an independent adjudicatory body should be created to review alleged viola-
tions, see S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 57, at 55-56, reprinted in LEGISLATrVE HIs-
TORY, supra note 17, at 194-95, and reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5177, 5220-21, and whether employers should be subjected to a general
duty clause. See H.R. REP. No. 1291, supra note 51, at 50-51, reprinted in LEGIS-
LATiVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 880-81. A fourth major controversy concerned
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troduced five months later by Representative Steiger,96 which
did not contain a "strike with pay" provision.9 7 Confronted
with this opposition, Representative Daniels sought to make
his bill more attractive by deleting, among other things, the
bill's "strike with pay" provision.98 Daniels explained,
The provision on employees not losing pay was so generally misun-
derstood that we have decided to drop it. We have no provision for
payment of employees who want to absent themselves from risk of
harm; instead, we have this amendment which enables employees sub-
ject to a risk of harm to get the Secretary into the situation quickly.99
This proposed modification was never adopted into H.R. 16785,
and the House instead passed Representative Steiger's alterna-
tive bill.100 The alternative bill said nothing about the right of
employees to walk off the job, but did allow the Secretary to ob-
tain temporary restraining orders in federal court to enjoin im-
the Secretary's right to order administrative shutdowns. See text accompany-
ing notes 122-127 infra.
96. The alternative bill, H.R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter
cited as H.R. 19200], reprinted in LEGISLATiVE IhSTORY, supra note 17, at 763-830
(Rep. Steiger's bill), was introduced on September 15, 1970, see 116 CONG. REC.
31,914 (1970), five months after H.R. 16785, which was introduced on April 7,
1970. See 116 CONG. REC. 10,656 (1970).
H.R. 16785 was the first OSHA bill introduced in the second session of the
Ninety-first Congress. Four other bills had been introduced in the House in
1969: H.R. 13373, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in LEGisLATIVE HIsTORY,
supra note 17, at 679-720 (Administration bill); H.R. 4294, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 659-78 (Rep. Per-
kins' bill); H.R. 3809, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 17, at 629-58 (Rep. O'Hara's bill); H.R. 843, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 599-628 (Rep.
Hathaway's bill).
97. See H.R. 19200, supra note 96, § 23(a) (4), (a) (5), (b) (1970), reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 817-18.
98. The proposed change was to remove the "strike with pay" provision
and substitute one granting employees the right to request immediate inspec-
tions. See 116 CONG. REC. 38,377-78 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 1008-09 (remarks of Rep. Daniels including text of Amend-
ment No. 3 to H.R. 16785). Such a provision eventually was incorporated into
law, 29 U.S.C. § 657(f) (1) (1976), but since the proposed change was never con-
sidered by the House, see note 100 infra, any similarity between the proposed
amendments and the provisions of OSHA should be accorded little weight in
assessing congressional intent.
99. 116 CONG. REc. 38,377-78 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATvE "HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 1009 (remarks of Rep. Daniels).
100. The amendment was not considered by the House, because the alter-
native bill, HR. 19200, was introduced the following day by way of a substitute
for H.R. 16785. See 116 CONG. REC. 38,715 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 17, at 1092 (question called on amendment to substitute Rep-
resentative Steiger's bill, HR. 19200, for Representative Daniels' bill); 116 CONG.
REC. 38,723-24 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 1112-
14 (amendment passed). The amended bill passed the same day. 116 CONG.
REc. 38,724 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 1115-18.
See generally Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 728 n.28 (6th Cir.), ap-
peal docketed, No. 78-1870 (Sept 21, 1979).
OSHA1979]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
minently dangerous work. 0 1
The Senate bill, S. 2193,102 did not contain a "strike with
pay" provision, 10 3 but did provide that an employee could re-
quest an immediate inspection by notifying the Secretary in
writing of an imminently dangerous situation. 0 4 Although it-
self controversial, 0 5 the bill was passed by the Senate one
week before the House acted on H.R. 16785.106 The Conference
Committee adopted most of the provisions of the Senate bill,
including the provision granting employees the right to contact
an inspector immediately when faced with an imminent dan-
ger.10 7 The preceding events have been characterized as repre-
senting a specific determination by Congress that, under
OSHA, employees are to have no implicit right to walk out
when confronted by immediate hazard because the right to
summon an inspector was intentionally substituted in place of
the right to walk out. 0 8
101. H.R. 19200, supra note 96, § 12, reprinted in LEGISLATVE HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 796-98, 1101-02.
102. S. 2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as S. 21931, re-
printed in LEGSLATrvE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 204-95 (as amended from
1969 session upon introduction on Oct. 6, 1970).
103. See 116 CONG. REC. 37,326 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 416 (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("the committee bill does not
contain a so-called strike-pay provision").
104. S. 2193, supra note 102, § 8(f) (1), reprinted in LEGISLATrVE ISTORY,
supra note 17, at 252-53.
105. Opposition to S. 2193 centered on the vesting of standard-making and
adjudicatory powers in the Secretary, and in the bill's authorization of adminis-
trative shutdowns. See S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 57, at 54-64, reprinted in
LEGISLATvE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 193-203, and reprinted in [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5218-27. Cf. note 95 supra (controversy involved
in H.R. 16785).
106. The Senate passed an amended version of S. 2193 on November 17,
1970, see 116 CONG. REC. 37,632 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATME HISTORY, supra
note 17, at 528, about one week before H.R. 19200 was accepted and passed as a
substitute for H.R. 16785 on November 24, 1970. See 116 CONG. REc. 38,724
(1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 1112-18.
107. See CoNF. REP. No. 1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, 37-38 (1970) [herein-
after cited as CoNF. REP. No. 1765], reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 17, at 1164-65, 1190-91, and reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5228, 5234. The provision is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 657(f) (1976).
108. See, e.g., Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 714 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978); Usery v. Whirlpool Corp., 416 F. Supp. 30, 34
(N.D. Ohio 1976), rev'd sub nom. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th
Cir.), appeal docketed, No. 78-1870 (Sept. 21, 1979); Brief for Appellee Cross-Ap-
pellant [Whirlpool Corp.] at 26, Usery v. Whirlpool Corp., reported sub noma.
Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir.), appeal docketed, No. 78-
1870 (Sept. 21, 1979) ('The foregoing review of the Act's legislative history
makes it clear that both houses of Congress expressly rejected the idea of em-
ployees having the right to walk off the job with pay and embraced instead the
request-for-inspection provision.").
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2. Legislative Intent
The determination of whether Congress, by rejecting the
"strike with pay" provision, intended to eliminate the right to
walk off the job when faced with imminent danger, requires a
comparison of the scope and effect of the two rights. The
"strike with pay" provision related to concentrations of toxic
substances in the workplace and was not premised on the
existence of an imminent hazard.10 9 The Secretary's regula-
tion, however, deals only with imminent hazards that present
"a real danger of death or serious injury."" 0 Besides not re-
quiring an imminent danger to health or safety, the "strike with
pay" provision was inoperative unless an employer had not
taken action to protect his employees "[w]ithin sixty days of
[a] determination by the Secretary... of potential toxicity of
any substance" in the workplace."' Moreover, it provided that
the "employee may absent himself from such risk of harm for
the period necessary to avoid such danger" without any refer-
ence to the degree of the threat which was posed by the pres-
ence of toxins. 112 The Secretary's regulation, on the other
hand, narrowly restricts the right to walk off the job to situa-
tions where the
condition causing the employee's apprehension of death or injury [is]
of such a nature that a reasonable person, under the circumstances
then confronting the employee, would conclude that there is a real dan-
ger of death or serious injury and that there is insufficient time, due to
the urgency of the situation, to eliminate the danger through resort to
regular statutory enforcement channels. In addition, in such circum-
stances, the employee, where possible, must also have sought from his
employer, and been unable to obtain, a correction of the dangerous
condition.113
The major objection to the "strike with pay" provision was its
directive that an employer must allow the "exposed employee
[to] absent himself... without loss of regular compensation"
during the period that the employee refused to work. 1 4 The
109. See M-R, 16785, supra note 90, § 19(a)(5), reprinted in LEGISLA I-rvE hs-
TORY, supra note 17, at 755 ('The Secretary... shall publish ... a list of all
known or potentially toxic substances and the concentrations at which such
toxicity is known to occur . . ").
110. 29 C.F.R. 1977.12(b) (2) (1978). Under the Act as it was adopted, any
breach of a safety or health standard developed by the Secretary creates a right
to "request an inspection." 29 U.S.C. § 657(f) (1) (1976).
111. IMR. 16785, supra note 90, § 19(a)(5), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 755.
112. H.R. 16785, supra note 90, § 19(a) (5), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY,
supra note 17, at 756.
113. 29 C.FRL § 1977.12(b) (2) (1978) (emphasis added).
114. H.R. 16785, supra note 90, § 19(a)(5), reprinted in LEGISLATIvE HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 756.
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Secretary's regulation, however, does not guarantee salary, but
simply protects the employee from subsequent discharge or
other retaliatory measures if he, "with no reasonable alterna-
tive, refuses in good faith to expose himself to the dangerous
condition." 115
The disparity in the scope of the two approaches is evident.
Of all the distinctions, however, the most significant to Con-
gress was the "with pay" aspect of the "strike with pay" provi-
sion in the rejected House bill. When the provision was
discussed, it was inevitably in the context of "strike with
pay."116 Thus, rather than focusing on the possibility that em-
ployees might prefer not receiving pay to performing hazardous
work assignments, Congress was concerned primarily with the
possibility that the provision would enable employees to de-
mand full pay while indiscriminately abandoning a job location.
As one Representative noted:
If H.R. 16785 passes as is, it will add more fuel to the fire in an al-
ready turbulent labor arena. Unions could and would use H.R. 16785 to
disregard the no-strike provisions in collective agreements. Further,
even if union officers were against a local strike, "red hot" rank-and-file
members could and would disregard their contractual no-strike
pledge.1 17
It is obvious that Congress considered the "strike" aspect
of the "strike with pay" provision as only incidental to the
"with pay" guarantee. Employees, after all, already had the
115. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b) (2) (1978).
116. On at least nine occasions when the provision was specifically ad-
dressed during legislative activity, it was characterized as strike with pay. See
116 CONG. REC. 38,714 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17,
at 1089 (remarks of Rep. Horton); 116 CONG. REC. 38,707 (1970), reprinted in
LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 1071 (remarks of Rep. Daniels) ("we
have deleted a provision which was-though inaccurately-called a 'strike with
pay' provision"); 116 CONG. REc. 38,391 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 17, at 1046 (remarks of Rep. Feighan); 116 CONG. REC. 38,379
(1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 1011 (remarks of
Rep. Randall); 116 CONG. REc. 38,377-78 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATlVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 17, at 1009 (remarks of Rep. Daniels) ('This amendment is a
substitute for the provision ... permitting employees to absent themselves...
without loss of pay.... The provision on employees not losing pay was so
generally misunderstood that we have decided to drop it.") (emphasis added);
116 CONG. REC. 38,376 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17,
at 1005 (remarks of Rep. Daniels) ("the provision ... has been frequently mis-
interpreted as a 'strike with pay' provision"); 116 CONG. REC. 38,369 (1970), re-
printed in LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 986 (remarks of Rep.
Perkins) ("the so-called 'strike with pay' provision, has been deleted"); 116
CONG. REc. 37,326 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATWVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at
416 (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("the committee bill does not contain a so-
called strike-pay provision").
117. 116 CONG. REC. 38,393 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATImE HISTORY, supra
note 17, at 1050 (remarks of Rep. Michel).
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right under section 7 of the NLRA to strike in protest over con-
ditions affecting the collective safety of workers.118 Moreover, it
has been held that when employees facing abnormally hazard-
ous conditions have walked out en masse despite a no-strike
compulsory arbitration clause, such concerted activity is not a
"strike."" 9 The intent of Congress in enacting OSHA was to
ensure safety in the workplace by expanding these employee
rights, not by compromising them. As the court noted in Usery
v. Babcock & WilcoX Co., 12 °
because Congress considered and rejected a "strike with pay" provi-
sion [does not mean] that it thereby considered and rejected the right
of an employee to refuse to work in an inherently dangerous environ-
ment .... Even more tenuous is the... suggestion that Congress, by
its action described above, implicitly sanctioned the discharge of em-
ployees who refused to work in abnormally dangerous surroundings.
Such an implication, would be completely contradictory to the purpose
of OSHA. 12 1
B. ADMINISTRATIVE SHUTDOWN PROVISION
1. Legislative Action
The second justification advanced by courts that have de-
clared the Secretary's regulation invalid is the Senate's rejec-
tion of a provision in its bill that would have given inspectors
the right to issue an order restraining the operation of a busi-
ness for up to seventy-two hours upon a finding of imminent
danger.122 This provision 12 3 was less harsh than the clause re-
jected in the House bill, which provided for shutdown orders of
118. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum
Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962) ('he language of § 7 is broad enough to protect con-
certed activities whether they take place before, after, or at the same time
[that] a demand [on the employer to remedy an objectionable condition] is
made."); NLRB v. Leslie Metal Arts Co., 509 F.2d 811, 814 (6th Cir. 1975) ("[T]he
personal safety of employees is a ... valid basis of a labor dispute....
Under such circumstances [employees] could legitimately protest by concerted
activity .... ).
119. NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753, 759 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. de-
nied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958) ('The heat and humidity... joined in creating the ab-
normal danger.... Since Section 502 [of the Taft-Hartley Act] provides that
walking out under a good faith belief of abnormally dangerous conditions does
not constitute a strike, the no-strike provision was not applicable."). See 29
U.S.C. § 143 (1976).
120. 424 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
121. Id. at 756-57.
122. See Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 713-14 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
123. S. 2193, supra note 102, § 12(b), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 562-63.
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up to five days, 12 4 and more harsh than the provision ultimately
passed by the House, which granted courts the exclusive au-
thority to enjoin violations upon application by the Secre-
tary.125 The Conference Committee deleted the administrative
shutdown authority contained in the Senate bill and adopted a
version of the House proposal.126 These events have been char-
acterized as indicating that, because Congress expressly denied
shutdown authority to trained OSHA inspectors, Congress did
not intend to allow employees to shut down a business by
walking off the job.127
2. Legislative Intent
The question of whether Congress intended to eliminate
the right to walk off the job in the face of imminent danger by
rejecting the administrative shutdown provision again involves
a consideration of the scope and effect of the two rights. Al-
though the subsection of the bill containing the administrative
shutdown provision evolved into the current imminent danger
section of OSHA, the two subsections differ in several material
respects. First, the shutdown provision would have resulted in
a total cessation of activity in a dangerous plant for up to three
days upon the Secretary's finding of imminent danger. 128 The
Secretary's regulation, however, is limited to situations in
124. H.R. 16785, supra note 90, § 12(a), reprinted in LEGISLATIrv HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 742.
125. HR. 19200, supra note 96, § 12, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 796-98.
126. See CoNF. REP. No. 1765, supra note 107, at 40, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 17, at 1193, and reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5228, 5236.
127. See. e.g., Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 714 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978) ("Apparently believing that workers might also
attempt unduly to influence OSHA inspectors if these officials were given the
authority to issue administrative orders restraining an employer's business op-
erations, Congress gave the federal courts the sole authority to enjoin ... an
employer's business .... "); Usery v. Whirlpool Corp., 416 F. Supp. 30, 34 (N.D.
Ohio 1976) ("It is obvious that Congress considered the shut-down of an opera-
tion such a serious matter that nothing short of the judicial process... was
acceptable as a means of accomplishing it. Certainly allowing employees to
simply walk off the job was not acceptable."), rev'd, Marshall v. Whirlpool
Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir.), appeal docketed, No. 78-1870 (Sept. 21, 1979).
128. S. 2193, supra note 102, § 12(b), reprinted in LEGISLATVE HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 562-63 ("[Tjhe Secretary shall issue an order... prohibiting
the employment or presence of any individual in locations or under conditions
where such imminent danger exists .... Such order may remain in effect for
not more than seventy-two hours ... ."). Apparently an inspector only needed
greater authority than his own presence when he proposed to close a plant "in
substantial part." See 116 CONG. REc. 37,624 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATVE
HISTORY, supra note 17, at 508 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
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which "an employee is confronted with a choice between not
performing assigned tasks or subjecting himself to serious in-
jury or death arising from a hazardous condition at the work-
place."'129 The right defined in the regulation is thus personal,
not collective, and its exercise in most cases would not entail
shutting down an entire plant. Second, the shutdown provision
authorized an inspector at the scene to "issue an order requir-
ing such steps to be taken as may be necessary to avoid, cor-
rect, or remove such imminent danger."'130 The Secretary's
regulation is far less onerous since it does not contemplate im-
mediate, on-the-spot remedies. It instead simply authorizes an
employee to leave, without fear of reprisal, until it is possible
"to eliminate the danger through resort to regular statutory en-
forcement channels.' 3 1 Third, the shutdown provision made
the inspector's finding of imminent danger determinative of the
employees' right to walk off the job en masse, regardless of the
number of employees actually threatened.132 Unauthorized
walkouts could otherwise be conducted with impunity. The
regulation, on the other hand, conditions an employee's ability
to walk off the job on the reasonableness of his personal appre-
hension of death or injury.13 3 Finally, the shutdown provision
is premised on the judgment of a federal officer, while the Sec-
retary's regulation is actuated by employee determinations of
danger.13
The difference in the scope of the two approaches is evi-
dent. The most significant aspect of the shutdown provision to
Congress was the fact that it authorized government interven-
tion in the labor-management arena with immediate and far-
reaching impact. The result was a fear that the section would
be found unconstitutional. Senator Dominick expressed a con-
cern representative of that felt by Congress:
[I]f [an inspector] thinks there is an imminent danger somewhere, all
he has to do-one man, as an inspector-is to call the regional office or
somebody else in the Labor Department and shut down the whole
129. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b) (2) (1978).
130. S. 2193, supra note 102, § 12(b), reprinted in LEGISLATVE HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 563.
131. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b) (2) (1978).
132. See S. 2193, supra note 102, § 12(b), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 562-63.
133. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b) (2) (1978) ('"The condition causing the employee's
apprehension of death or injury must be of such a nature that a reasonable per-
son, under the circumstances then confronting the employee, would conclude
that there is a real danger of death or serious injury .... ).
134. Compare note 128 supra ("Secretary shall issue an order") with note
133 supra (employee determines whether "a real danger of death or serious in-
jury" exists).
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plant immediately, by an order, without any court findings, without any
adjudication, without any due process.1 3 5
Congress was also concerned with the possibility that striking
employees would abuse the shutdown power by focusing pres-
sure on OSHA inspectors:
More realistically, the all powerful inspector would become a pawn in
labor disputes.
The great potential for misuse that would be created if this power
were put into the hands of an inspector in the field was amply demon-
strated during the public hearings .... Thus, this unrestricted power
in one person would realistically find itself in the middle of labor-man-
agement disputes. It would be far simpler for a disgruntled employee
to pass by established labor-management grievance procedures and
complain to a federal safety inspector that unsafe conditions existed
when the real basis of a dispute was properly a labor-management
problem .... 136
It is clear, therefore, that the concern of Congress was not
over the right of an individual employee to exercise his per-
sonal discretion about work conditions that immediately
threatened his safety. Rather, the fear was that direct govern-
ment involvement in plant shutdowns might present constitu-
tional problems through an abuse of power "culminating in a
breakdown of Governmental neutrality in labor-management
relations.1 37
C. CONCLUSION
In considering the rejected "strike with pay" and modified
administrative shutdown provisions, Congress never directly
addressed the issue of whether an employee had the right
under OSHA to absent himself from the workplace at the risk
of discipline for having unreasonably apprehended the exist-
ence of imminent danger. Moreover, Congress' concern over
both provisions reflects fears over labor-management impacts
135. 116 CONG. REC. 37,388 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 17, at 425 (remarks of Sen. Dominick). See H.R. REP. No. 1291, supra note
51, at 56, reprinted in LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 886 (minority re-
port) ("In essence, the exercise of this shut-down power amounts to summary
punishment which is contrary to our established standards of law.").
136. H.R. REP. No. 1291, supra note 51, at 56, reprinted in LEGISLATvE IS-
TORY, supra note 17, at 886 (minority report). The minority report cited as sup-
port for its conclusion an incident in a Texas jet fuel refinery in which union
employees went out on strike at 2 a.m. on a Sunday morning with only a few
minutes' notice to management. Management personnel operated the plant to
maintain the firm's obligations under a government contract, but the union sent
a complaint to the Secretary of Labor charging that the plant was unsafe be-
cause it was operated with less than a full crew. Despite two prior safety in-
spections that year, the Secretary was asked to use his authority under the
Walsh-Healey Act to find the operation of the plant unsafe. Id.
137. 116 CONG. REC. 37,346 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 17, at 448 (remarks of Sen. Tower).
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that are significantly different from those of the Secretary's reg-
ulation. 13 The two provisions should not, therefore, be consid-
ered to control the validity of the imminent danger regulation.
This is particularly true given Congress' broad delegation of au-
thority to the Secretary to promulgate regulations, and given
the strong remedial purpose of the Act.
A few years after OSHA was enacted, Congress passed a
statute with a similar imminent danger provision. The legisla-
tive history of that act-the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Amendments Act of 1977' 39-makes it clear that Congress in-
tended miners to be able to leave a dangerous job at their own
discretion, without fear of discipline:
[T]he Committee intends [the Act] to be construed expansively to as-
sure that miners will not be inhibited in any way in exercising any
rights afforded by the legislation. This section is intended to give min-
ers, their representatives, and applicants, the right to refuse to work in
conditions they believe to be unsafe or unhealthful and to refuse to
comply if their employers order them to violate a safety and health
standard promulgated under the law.14°
The issue of walldng off the job was raised on the Senate floor.
It is my impression that the purpose of this section is to insure
that miners will play an active role in the enforcement of the act by
protecting them against any possible discrimination ....
It seems to me that this goal cannot be achieved unless miners
faced with conditions that they believe threaten their safety and health
have the right to refuse work without fear of reprisal. Does the com-
mittee contemplate that such a right would be afforded under this sec-
tion?141
Senator Williams-the same legislator whose bill was largely
adopted as OSHA seven years earlier-replied:
The committee intends that miners not be faced with the Hobson's
choice of deciding between their safety and health or their jobs.
The right to refuse work under conditions that a miner believes in
good faith to threaten his health and safety is essential if this act is to
achieve its goal of a safe and healthful workplace for all miners.
142
138. Concern with the "strike with pay" provision was largely over the pros-
pect of federally guaranteed full wages for walkouts that could be completely
unrelated to the actual degree of danger faced by an employee. See notes 116-
17 supra and accompanying text. Concern with the administrative shutdown
provision was largely over the constitutional implications of government in-
volvement in labor-management relations. See notes 135-137 supra and accom-
panying text.
139. Pub. I No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (1977) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-961
(Supp. I 1977)).
140. S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3436.
141. 123 CONG. REC. S10,287-88 (daily ed. June 21, 1977) (remarks of Sen.
Church).
142. Id. at S10,288 (remarks of Sen. Williams). Senator Javits replied, "I
think the chairman has succinctly presented the thinking of the committee on
this matter. Without such a right, workers acting in good faith would not be
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Senator Williams' reply amply demonstrates Congress' un-
derstanding of the nature of remedial safety statutes. When
the safety standards set by Congress are vague and optimistic,
and the number of government enforcement personnel is woe-
fully inadequate to ensure compliance, there is only one infer-
ence possible: that Congress intended employees to play an
active role in enforcement. It would be paradoxical to impute
to Congress the intent to condone the retaliatory discharge of
employees who refuse to face hazardous work conditions when
Congress expressly announced its intent to enlist the aid of
employees in making workplaces safer.143
V. EFFECT OF RECOGNIZING THE IMPLICIT RIGHT
This Article has suggested that Congress, by eliminating
the "strike with pay" and administrative shutdown provisions
from OSHA, did not intend to limit employees' right to self-pro-
tection, but simply intended to provide for a limited right of
self-help. There remains to be discussed, however, the issue of
whether other remedial statutes provide sufficient protection,
or whether such protection may be implied only under OSHA.
A. SCOPE OF OTHER REMEDIES
Remedies at common law are limited largely to suits for in-
juries after they have occurred, 144 and courts are hesitant to
limit the right of employers to discharge employees who refuse
to perform as directed.145 Although employer retaliation may
be compensable if demonstrably in "bad faith,' 46 the use of af-
ter-the-fact remedies is not an efficient method to accomplish
OSHA's goal of ensuring safe and healthful workplaces.
The NLRA, as amended by section 502 of the Labor Man-
able to afford themselves their rights under the full protection of the act as re-
sponsible human beings." Id.
143. See generally Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 735-36 (6th
Cir.), appeal docketed, No. 78-1870 (Sept. 21, 1979).
144. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (4th
ed. 1971).
145. Compare Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976)
(no wrongful discharge for firing employee who revealed product misrepresen-
tation to government) and Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319
A.2d 174 (1974) (no wrongful discharge for firing employee who revealed poten-
tially dangerous defect in employer's product to potential purchasers) with
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (discharge of "at
will" employee wrongful only when in bad faith; wrongful to fire employee who
refused to engage in sexual relations with foreman).
146. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
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agement Relations Act,147 provides that a walkout "in good
faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at
the place of employment" is not a strike but an acceptable tac-
tical approach.148 The Supreme Court, however, has construed
the NLRA's walkout provision as requiring proof by a union of
"ascertainable, objective evidence supporting its conclusion
that an abnormally dangerous condition for work exists."' 49
This standard requires more than a good faith belief. There
must be exacting proof that an objective, reasonable person
would conclude that an abnormally dangerous condition exists.
Moreover, since the NLRA's walkout provision is addressed to
group walkouts, the withdrawal of a single employee may not
constitute a sufficiently "concerted" activity to warrant the pro-
tective machinery of the NLRA. 50 Under the NLRA, employ-
ees therefore have a remedy only by resort to the collective
bargaining strength of their union; the ability of their union
representative will be determinative of whether work stoppage
is permissible. The right to walk out under section 7 of the
NLRA is thus not coextensive with the Secretary's OSHA regu-
lation.
B. SCOPE AND APPROPRIATENESS OF THE IMPI'Crr RIGHT
The Secretary's regulation provides employees who face
immediate danger the right to walk off the job.151 If employees
do so, however, their employers may discipline them. Each em-
ployee then has the right to seek relief under the regulation:
At trial he must prove before a federal judge 1) his good faith in taking
the action, 2) that he had no reasonable alternative, and 3) that his ap-
prehension of death or serious injury was based on circumstances then
facing him which would cause a reasonable person to reach the same
conclusion, and 4) that the urgency of the situation provided "insuffi-
cient time... to eliminate the danger by resort to regular statutory en-
147. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, tit. V, § 502, 61 Stat.
162 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976)).
148. Id.
149. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 387 (1974)
(quoting Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 1157, 1162 (3d Cir.
1972) (Rosenn, J., dissenting)).
150. See, e.g., NLRB v. C & I Air Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977, 978 (9th Cir.
1973) (employee who was discharged after complaining of safety hazard caused
by stairway collapsing beneath him held not engaged in concerted activity pro-
tected by NLRA); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884-85 (3d Cir.
1971) (employee who was discharged after demanding holiday pay for himself
under collective bargaining agreement held not engaged in concerted activity
protected by NLRA).
151. 29 C.F.I § 1977.12(b) (2) (1978).
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forcement channels." 152
This proof requirement, while not as burdensome to the
employee as that required to invoke NLRA section 7,153 does re-
quire the employee to risk discipline should he fail to meet it.
The regulation, therefore, is distinct from the "strike with pay"
and the administrative shutdown provisions of OSHA, which
would have permitted an employee to leave a job site with im-
punity upon a governmental determination of "toxicity" or "im-
minent danger." Though placing some risk on employees, the
regulation clearly fits OSHA's purpose: ensuring employees a
safe and healthful workplace. It bridges a gap in the Act, af-
fording protection to employees in the interim between their
confrontations with danger and the arrival of OSHA inspectors.
Moreover, the regulation aids in the enforcement of statutory
requirements by affording coverage of the Act's retaliatory dis-
charge provision to all employees who complain of hazardous
work conditions.
The "imminent danger" regulation, which permits employ-
ees to walk off the job if they reasonably believe themselves to
be confronted with an immediate threat to life or health, is a
proper reading of the enabling legislation, and should be ac-
corded the deference normally given promulgations made
under broad, remedial statutes. Congress enacted OSHA so
that American employees would no longer have to make a Hob-
son's choice between their jobs and their lives.
152. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 735 (6th Cir.) (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1977.12(b) (2) (1978)), appeal docketed, No. 78-1870 (Sept. 21, 1979).
153. See text accompanying notes 147-150 supra.
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